A recent literature introduces autonomous demand as the driver of long-run economic growth and as a stabilizing force that tames Harrodian instability. The argument is unconvincing. The stabilizing e §ect is modest for plausible parameter values and, more importantly, it is questionable whether any components of aggregate demand can be viewed as autonomous in the long run. By contrast, models that include the supply side (the labor market) and/or economic policy can address Harrodian instability and produce level and growth e §ects that resemble those derived in the literature on autonomous demand. JEL numbers: E11, E12, O41
Stability conditions and calibration
The combination of autonomous demand with a simple Harrodian investment function typically gives rise to a two-dimensional system of di §erential equations. Focusing on Lavoieís (2016) model, Skott (2017a) argued that the steadygrowth solution is unlikely to be stable for any plausible set of parameter values. The precise stability conditions depend on the detailed assumptions of the model, but the basic structure is similar across di §erent versions, and the weakness of the stabilizing autonomous-demand e §ect is quite intuitive: a sizable proportion of aggregate demand would need to be determined independently of the trajectory of actual income in order to provide signiÖcant amounts of stabilization.
In his response Lavoie (2017, pp. 2) does not challenge the numerical calibration of the model. Instead, he argues that "checking for plausible values in such abstract models is a meaningless exercise" and that "Skott takes overly seriously the worth of the little models that we build for exposition and heuristics purposes". Quoting Franke (2017a) , he goes on to suggest that proportional taxes may overcome Harrodian instability. This is a peculiar response. The literature has analyzed the stabilizing e §ects of autonomous demand and claimed, in Lavoieís words, that "the Harrodian principle of dynamic instability gets tamed by the presence of autonomous consumer expenditures" (Lavoie 2016, p. 172 ). If stabilization is achieved through other mechanisms, including Öscal policy, why claim that autonomous demand does the stabilization?
The broader admonition against íchecking for plausible valuesí and taking models íoverly seriouslyí is misguided, too. The autonomous-demand literature relies on the simple models to support its stability claim, and this claim is intrinsically quantitative. Whether or not stability is being achieved depends on the relative magnitudes of di §erent e §ects. A stability claim cannot be made without judgments ñ implicit or explicit ñ about numerical magnitudes and íplausible valuesí. If the models are too abstract to allow meaningful quantitative calibration, the stability claims in the autonomous-demand literature become meaningless.
Models represent thought experiments that isolate particular factors and effects. The formalization can provide clarity and facilitate a quantitative analysis, but clearly one has to be cautious in real-world applications. A model that has been designed to explore a particular mechanism cannot predict or fully explain real-world outcomes that are ináuenced by many other mechanisms. This cautionary note does not make the consideration of numerical magnitudes irrelevant for the analysis of the particular mechanism highlighted by the model. When analyzing Öscal policy ñ which is only one determinant of macroeconomic outcomes ñ we want estimates of the likely magnitude of Öscal multipliers, and empirical evidence on consumption behavior will inform these estimates. Analogously, if we want to analyze the stabilizing e §ects of autonomous demand, we need numerical estimates of, inter alia, the share of autonomous demand in 2 total income. 3 3 The exogeneity assumption and íthe long runí
The literature has considered several potential sources of autonomous demand, including exports, private consumption, residential investment and government consumption. I shall discuss each of these in turn.
Exports
Dutt (2015) and Girardi and Pariboni (2016) are among the studies that include exports as a source of autonomous demand. The rationale may seem obvious and unquestionable: foreign income is an important determinant of exports, and exports make up a signiÖcant proportion of aggregate demand in small open economies. There is a problem, however. A single country could be stabilized by exports, but the argument does not carry over to the world economy. For the economic system as a whole there are no exports. An appeal to exports as the source of autonomous demand makes the analysis intrinsically partial, and any attempt to extend the conclusions to the system as a whole would involve a fallacy of composition. Country i may be stabilized by and have its growth rate determined by the rest of world, but this leaves open the determination of the growth rate in the rest of the world.
Disregarding the partial nature of the analysis, one may question the exogeneity of exports. Foreign income is an important determinant of exports, and if the home country is small, foreign income and its growth rate can be taken as exogenous. But foreign income is not the only determinant of exports: the competitiveness of the domestic export sector also matters, and the real exchange rate can be a §ected by a range of domestic factors, including interest rates and the level and growth rate of domestic demand.
Private consumption
Private consumption is at the center of the analysis in Serrano and Freitas (2015a, 2015b) , Cesaratto (2015) , Pariboni (2016) and Lavoie (2016) .
Capitalists ñ or more generally, the rich ñ can draw on their wealth and need not be income constrained. Indeed, it may seem reasonable to assume that the rich leave some components of their consumption untouched in bad times. But that is not su¢cient to make these components autonomous in the sense of the literature. Luxury consumption is notoriously cyclical, and if one component of capitalist consumption (luxury yachts and dinners at Öve star restaurants) adjusts strongly, total capitalist consumption can be income-determined, even if other components grow at a relatively constant rate. In fact, it may be di¢cult to think of any consumption component of the rich that is truly autonomous. Food consumption would be an obvious candidate, but although the rich will never go to bed hungry, the demand for Chateau LaÖte or Beluga Caviar may depend heavily on the state of the economy.
It is logically possible, of course, that causation runs from capitalist consumption to aggregate income and that exogenous áuctuations in capitalists consumption drive the business cycle. But the literature has provided no argument to support this hypothesis, and the volatility and procyclicality of luxury consumption suggest that capitalist consumption is ináuenced by income. 4 Basic consumption ñ the consumption of necessities ñ is another possible source of autonomous demand. The quantitative signiÖcance of basic consumption depends on the deÖnition of necessities. DeÖned narrowly as the physiological minimum to ensure survival, the share of basic consumption in income is very small in advanced economies. Basic consumption, moreover, ceases to be autonomous if the sum of basic and discretionary consumption is determined by income. Using a broader social and historical deÖnition of basic consumption, the argument faces another problem: community standards of basic consumption may be autonomous in the short run, but they evolve over time in response to trends in average incomes and consumption. Basic consumption, in other words, is not autonomous from a medium and long run perspective. 5 Strong empirical evidence could alleviate these concerns, and a study by Wen (2007) has been highlighted by Lavoie (2016) in support of autonomous consumption. Wen Önds that consumption growth Granger causes investment growth, and that the causal relation is unidirectional; investment growth does not Granger cause consumption growth.
The relevance of the Wen study and of Granger causality, more generally, for the issues at hand is unclear. Consider the following variation of the HicksSamuelson multiplier-accelerator model:
Straightforward manipulations imply that the change in investment can be written
The change in consumption is
Granger causality tests along the lines of Wen would show unidirectional causation from changes in consumption to changes in investment. There is no autonomous demand, however; investment is the only predetermined demand component in any short period; the dynamics are driven by investment; and essentially the multiplier-accelerator mechanism represents a simpliÖed version of the Harrodian argument. 6 The example is not being o §ered because it represents a good model of actual income dynamics (it does not). But it provides a simple demonstration that income-determined consumption can be compatible with the absence of any Granger causation from investment growth to consumption growth as well as with Granger causality from consumption growth to investment growth. 7 In fact, Granger causality from consumption to investment is exactly what the basic Harrodian argument predicts. In a capitalist economy Örms invest because they believe that investment will generate future proÖts. Beliefs about the additional proÖts from new investment, in turn, will be informed by past levels and changes in demand. If consumption follows output closely, the result is Granger causality from consumption to investment. The proportional, contemporaneous relation between I and Y is unusual, and I know of no compelling reason ñ empirical or theoretical ñ for the exclusion of predetermined investment in the short run. Since they exclude lagged income e §ects on consumption, their model requires some source of autonomous demand in order to produce a positive short-run level of output.
There is no such requirement in the dynamic multiplier-accelerator model. The short-run equilibrium for output is given by
The stationary solution to this di §erence equation has Yt = 0; but the stationary solution need not be stable. If, say, Thus, Yt is positive for all t # 0 and asymptotically the growth rate converges to 0.05. 7 The dangers of conáating timing with causality have been stressed by Kaldor (1970) and Tobin (1970) , among others. Commenting on Friedman, Kaldor (1970, p. 6 ) noted that Every schoolboy knows that cash in the hands of the public regularly shoots up at Christmas ... .Nobody would suggest (not even Professor Friedman, I believe) that the increase in note circulation in December is the cause of the Christmas buying spree.
Residential investment
Residential investment is Önanced largely by credit (mortgages) and as such may seem a promising source of autonomous demand (Fiebiger 2014 , Girardi and Pariboni 2016 , Lavoie 2016 . Residential investment has another potential advantage: if the growth rate of population determines residential investment, a convergence of the growth rate of the economy to the growth rate of residential investment may also equalize the warranted and natural growth rates, using Harrodís terminology. 9 Unfortunately, the notion that residential investment is autonomous and grows at the natural rate does not meet simple behavioral and empirical tests. Residential investment is extremely volatile and bears no resemblance to the simple models in which autonomous demand grows at a constant rate. As with luxury consumption, one could claim that the volatile path of residential investment is indeed autonomous and that residential investment drives both the cycle and long-run growth. But the claim would be farfetched: do households determine their demand for housing independently of their incomes? Are householdsí ability to obtain mortgages independent of their incomes? Have interest rates no e §ect on residential investment and if they do, are movements in interest rates then also to be seen as independent of movements in aggregate income?
The trend in residential investment could be determined by population growth, even if the short-term volatility fails to be autonomous. The average long-run growth rate of residential consumption, however, is roughly the same as that of GDP, not that of employment or population. This pattern is not surprising. McMansions sprout when economies are booming and interest rates low; young people stay with their parents longer than otherwise when conditions are bad; per capita square footage and amenities increase with per capita income. Demography plays a role in housing demand. But it is a great leap from this observation to a claim that population growth determines the growth in housing demand. 10 There is an additional leap in claiming that a change in household spending on housing leaves no e §ects on household spending on other consumption (that is, that spending on housing is autonomous in the sense of the model).
runs not only from Z to Y, as expected, but also from Y to Z" (p. 13). Another Önding shows that changes in the growth rate a §ect the share of investment in income. This result is what a simple Harrodian argument would predict: if the utilization rate áuctuates around a constant desired value, an increase in the growth rate must raise the investment-output ratio. 9 The natural growth rate ñ the growth rate of the labor supply in e¢ciency units ñ need not be an exogenously given constant. It may, for instance, depend on the emplyment rate, as in Flaschel and Skott (2006) .
The equalization of warranted and natural growth rates would produce a constant employment rate in the long run. It would not, however, ensure that the employment rate takes a plausible value, or even that it stays below one. 10 The problem is similar to that which invalidates the use of basic consumption: if the basic need for housing is socially determined, then the medium and long run growth in residential investment cannot be taken as independent of the growth rate of incomes. 6 
Government consumption
Government consumption is highlighted by Allain (2015a) and Hein (2016) and also included by Dutt (2015) , Girardi and Pariboni (2016) . As a source of autonomous demand it may seem immune to the problems associated with private consumption and residential investment. Unlike agents in the private sector, the government can tax and print money; absent supply side constraints, government spending could be completely autonomous. Government consumption, moreover, makes up a signiÖcant proportion of aggregate demand in most advanced economies.
The fact that government spending could be autonomous does not imply that it is useful to approach government spending (and Öscal policy, more generally) in this way. Governments may have the ability to set Öscal policy independently of movements in other components of aggregate demand, but is there any evidence that this is how governments actually operate? And disregarding the descriptive accuracy with respect to actual behavior, are there good reasons to recommend autonomous spending policies of this kind?
There is no doubt that government consumption ñ and Öscal and monetary policy, more broadly ñ can be stabilizing. In fact, capitalist economies may not be viable without this stabilizing ináuence from a non-capitalist sector; I shall return to this issue in section 5. But a stabilizing government does not imply the long-run exogeneity of government consumption. Policy makers have not increased government consumption at a constant, exogenously given growth rate. The growth rate of government consumption varies. Some of the variations may be deemed autonomous from a short and medium run perspective; examples include changes in defense spending associated with military conáicts or changes in public education following a change of government. Other variations, however, are closely related to advances in income and technology; an example could be increases in health spending as new treatments become available. Some changes in government consumption, Önally, represent discretionary stabilization policy; stimulus packages like the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 exemplify this category. Tax revenues also exhibit variations, both as a result of automatic stabilizers and because of discretionary policy.
Overall, the exogeneity assumption does not match actual government behavior. Prescriptively, it would also be hard to justify policies that set government consumption and other Öscal parameters without any feedback from the performance of the economy. The appropriate size of the public sector is contentious, but it is hard to see how the desirability of any given amount of government consumption can be discussed without reference to aggregate income. The assumption of an exogenously given growth rate therefore seems misguided. Fiscal policy, moreover, may be needed for Keynesian reasons. It may make sense for believers in the stability and optimality of market outcomes to follow Friedman and advocate simple policy rules of this kind. But matters are di §erent if markets are prone to instability and lead to poor outcomes. Under these conditions there is a need for well-designed policy intervention. Lernerís (1943) notion of functional Önance embodies this view: Öscal and monetary pol-icy should be adjusted so as to maintain full employment and a desirable level of investment. 11 This approach is very di §erent from simply assuming exogenous trajectories for government consumption and other Öscal parameters.
Medium-run interpretations
Several contributors have suggested that the exogeneity of the growth rate of autonomous demand should be viewed as a medium-run phenomenon. Lavoie (2016) concedes that "in the long run there is no truly exogenous variable" (p. 194) and suggests that "neo-Kaleckian authors never had a long-run steady state in mind" (p. 175). Pariboni (2016, p. 222) is more speciÖc, arguing that autonomous demand and the supermultiplier may "help explaining speciÖc periods, episodes or modes of accumulation (and the seeds of forthcoming crises) within them as, for instance, the consumer debt-led growth of the íGreat Moderationí era that preceded the íGreat Recessioní".
A short-and medium-run interpretation of the autonomous-demand argument raises several questions. If short-and medium-run shocks to autonomous demand are to exert a stabilizing e §ect on an economy that su §ers from Harrodian instability then somehow the timing and magnitude of the shocks must match the needs of the economy; a positive shock to autonomous demand, for instance, is destabilizing in an overheating economy that experiences upward instability. It is not clear why the pattern of shocks would tend to be stabilizing if the shocks are exogenous. The question is not whether exogenous demand shocks can hit the economy and have induced e §ects on investment: Of course they can. The question is whether housing bubbles, military buildups or other autonomous movements in demand can be expected to stabilize a Harrodian economy.
Could it not be argued that long-run analysis becomes irrelevant in a world of fundamental uncertainty, that a medium-run analysis of the e §ects of exogenous movements in autonomous demand is all we need, and that the literature has provided this kind of medium run analysis? 12 This argument may seem appealing, but it is unsustainable as a defense of the autonomous demand literature: the literature on autonomous growth has itself been cast in terms that are intrinsically long run.
Assuming that autonomous demand grows at a constant rate, the literature has examined the existence and local stability properties of a steady growth path in which all components of demand ñ autonomous as well as induced ñ grow at this constant rate. Intuitively, a medium-run interpretation of this approach would suggest that the e §ects of a Önancial bubble (or other temporary shocks) can be analyzed by focusing on the steady-growth implications that would follow if the Önancial bubble were to last forever. The bubble will not last forever, and these steady-growth implications are of little interest unless the convergence to steady growth is fast. The convergence, however, cannot be fast. Fast adjustments to steady growth would require that accumulation respond quickly to changes in aggregate demand, and fast adjustment in accumulation is destabilizing in a Harrodian setting. 13 The model cannot produce both fast adjustment and stability.
The broader claim about the irrelevance of long-run analysis under conditions of fundamental uncertainty must also be rejected. Needless to say, the long-run dynamics of a stylized model will never get to be played out in their pure form in any real economies. We can be sure that unexpected events will intervene; new inventions may revolutionize production, political movements may force radical shifts in the legal and institutional framework of the economy, or wars may throw an economy into turmoil. But uncertainty and the knowledge that ísomethingí is bound to happen do not justify a neglect of the medium-and long-term consequences of the mechanisms that are being studied. Fundamental uncertainty, for instance, does not imply that we should ignore the long-run e §ects of carbon emissions. A large meteor may destroy all life or a genius may come up with a magic solution that eliminates the ill e §ects of carbon emissions. But these uncertainties do not justify a focus on the short run and a neglect of the long-run consequences of emissions.
Labor markets and the supply side
So far, the argument has been negative: the autonomous-demand literature has not, in my view, provided a convincing theory of long-run growth and, more speciÖcally, a way to reconcile Harrodian investment dynamics with the stylized facts. But a stripped-down Harrodian model of the goods market also fails to provide a good story for real-world economies: we do not generally observe cumulative divergence from steady growth. Advanced economies áuctuate, but the movements in the employment rate typically stay within a relatively narrow range.
The conversion of Harrodian instability into bounded áuctuations can be explained by feedback e §ects from the labor market and policy intervention. Consider a process of upward Harrodian divergence. Utilization rates above the desired level lead to rising accumulation rates which boost aggregate demand and raise utilization even further. This process is subject to obvious supply-side limits: there is an upper limit on the utilization rate, and prolonged periods of high growth will run into labor constraints. These supply-side constraints ináuence Örmsí investment and price/output decisions. Why invest in new capacity if it is becoming increasingly di¢cult to Önd workers to operate the new capacity? Why try to expand output if tight labor markets make it impossible to attract workers without having to raise wages above what other Örms are paying? More generally, as emphasized by Marx and Kalecki, high employment can be bad for ídiscipline in the factoriesí (Kalecki 1943 ) and depress Örmsí employment and investment decisions. In short, the supply side in a broad sense provides a ceiling on upward divergence through a variety of mechanisms.
It is harder to establish a áoor under the downturn. The same factors that establish the ceiling will work in reverse. When unemployment is high, Örms can pick and choose from an ample supply of well-qualiÖed workers, and the general business climate will beneÖt from weak and disciplined workers. Using US data, Skott and Zipperer (2012) Önd negative e §ects of the employment rate on both the accumulation rate and the growth rate of output. Other endogenous mechanism may supplement these forces. Skott (1989, p. 242) considers the possibility that "low rates of employment cause an upsurge in small scale business" and that the employment rate may "ináuence the share of saving in income (low employment rates implying low shares of saving)". 14 But the built-in feedback e §ects may be too weak to stabilize a pure capitalist economy and insure against a complete collapse (Skott 1989, Nakatani and Skott 2007 ). This conclusion is not invalidated by real-world evidence: empirically, the world has never seen a pure capitalist economy. Non-capitalist sectors ñ traditional agriculture, for instance, or a public sector ñ have always coexisted with the capitalist sector. As pointed out by Cesaratto (2015) , Luxemburg and Kalecki are among the writers who have emphasized the importance of these external sectors.
The public sector is the largest and most promising external sector in advanced economies, and Fazzari et al. (2013) introduce government consumption as a áoor under the downturn in a Harrodian model. They take the growth rate of government consumption to be exogenous, and in this respect their argument follows an autonomous-demand approach. There is no convergence to steady growth, however. Instead, a full-employment ceiling is used to curtail upward divergence, and the model generates endogenous cycles. This cyclical property does not require the equality between the growth rate of autonomous demand and the natural growth rate. But the predicted growth pattern "seems somewhat unrealistic" (Fazzari et al., 2013, p.17) unless the growth rate of autonomous demand is assumed equal to the natural rate of growth. There would be no reason for this condition to hold if the growth of government consumption were exogenous. But policy is not set independently of the evolution of incomes and employment. It responds to movements in the employment rate as well as to movements in ináation and other variables that are a §ected by employment.
The feedback e §ects from the labor market to Örmsí employment and investment decisions and to economic policy counteract Harrodian instability, prevent cumulative divergence, and equalize the warranted and natural growth rates. The autonomous-demand literature has largely ignored these feedback e §ects. It seems that for some reason the e §ects are seen as un-Keynesian or insu¢-ciently heterodox. Following Garegnani, Cesaratto (2015, p. 154) deÖnes the íKeynesian Hypothesisí as the idea that "investment is, in both the long run and the short run, independent of the savings that would be forthcoming from the normal utilisation of productive capacity". Autonomous demand, he argues, "overcomes the formal deÖciencies of previous models" (p. 178) and makes it possible to extend this hypothesis to the long run. Serrano and Freitas (2015b) suggest that the introduction of autonomous demand represents a "true heterodox alternative" because it allows for a "reconciliation of demand-led growth, exogenous distribution and a tendency to normal degree of capacity utilization" (p. 17). Lavoie (2016) repeatedly highlights the ability of the autonomousdemand approach to safeguard the main Keynesian message and concludes that "the paradox of thrift or the paradox of costs can be preserved ... by taking into account an autonomous growth component" (p. 195).
These are curious arguments. Why is it desirable to have models in which investment is independent of saving in the long run? Saving decisions ináuence aggregate demand, and any reasonable theory will imply that sustained changes in aggregate demand a §ect investment (as implied by both neo-Kaleckian and Harrodian growth models). Investment may be largely predetermined in the short run, but investment is induced ñ and ináuenced by changes in saving rates ñ as soon as we move beyond the short run.
Why is an exogenous distribution of income particularly Keynesian and heterodox? More importantly, why is it sensible to assume that the distribution of income is independent of income and employment? Must true heterodox alternatives exclude a Marxian emphasis on the role of the reserve army of labor and its possible e §ects on income distribution and accumulation? Indeed, if Keynesian theory requires an exclusive focus on the demand side of the goods market, then Keynes himself would make a poor Keynesian.
Why single out autonomous-demand models for their ability to produce level e §ects that Öt the íparadox of thriftí and the íparadox of costí ? The paradox of thrift ñ the contractionary e §ect of a rise in the saving rate ñ can be found in models based on feedback e §ects from the labor market (e.g. Skott (1989 Skott ( , 2015 and von Arnim and Barrales (2015)). In these models an increase in the saving rate reduces the employment rate and generates a level e §ect of the same kind as the one that can be found in the models with autonomous demand. The paradox of cost ñ a positive e §ect of a rise in the real wage on proÖts ñ ceases to be welldeÖned if the real wage is itself an endogenous variable (Skott 2017b) . One can examine, however, the e §ects of changes in parameters that ináuence wage and price determination. As an example, an increase in the degree of competition (a reduction, ceteris paribus, in the markup and an increase in real wages) leads to a rise in employment and proÖts in Skott (1989) . Thus, autonomous demand is neither necessary nor su¢cient to ísafeguard Keynesian conclusionsí. But needless to say, the safeguarding of speciÖc, desirable conclusions ñ whether Keynesian, Marxian or neoliberal ñ is not a good criterion for model selection. The case for including the supply side and economic policy rests on behavioral plausibility and empirical evidence.
Conclusion
The literature on autonomous demand accepts the Harrodian investment argument. In order to stabilize the Harrodian dynamics, however, the share of autonomous demand would need to be very high. More importantly, the literature is built on a premise that is shaky, both theoretically and empirically: it is unclear why the trajectory of a signiÖcant proportion of aggregate demand would be independent of past, current and expected future income.
There is no doubt that autonomous forces ináuence demand in the short and medium run. Demand shocks can take a variety of di §erent forms, and the e §ects can be important. But there is no reason why a stream of short and medium run exogenous shocks should o §set Harrodian instability and adjust the actual growth path towards the (time-varying) warranted path. The autonomous demand literature, moreover, has been intrinsically long run: its focus on steady growth paths in which the growth rates of all other components of demand have adjusted to the growth of autonomous demand is inconsistent with a medium-run perspective.
There are other ways to reconcile the Harrodian dynamics with the evidence. Changes in labor market conditions ináuence economic policy and a §ect Örmsí output and investment decisions as well as income distribution and saving. These feedback e §ects from the labor market can convert the Harrodian instability into persistent áuctuations. Post-Keynesian macroeconomists sometimes seem to have an aversion to any supply-side argument, including feedback e §ects from the labor market. This aversion can make the autonomous-demand mechanism seem attractive, but the aversion is hard to understand. The labor market and the supply side matter, and there is nothing particularly Keynesian about an exclusive focus on the demand side of the goods market. 15 Keynesians rightly criticize contemporary macroeconomics for its neglect of aggregate demand. The answer is not to adopt a reverse Sayís law and assume that whatever is demanded can and will be supplied.
